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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4317 
___________ 
 
JOHN BANDA, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
Y. CORNIEL, Program Coordinator sued in their personal capacities; M. MAIN, 
Director/Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; S. ADAMS, 
Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; T. SPANGUOLO, Treatment 
Team Member sued in their personal capacities; J. OTTINO, Treatment Team Member 
sued in their personal capacities; C. BERGEN, Treatment Team Member sued in their 
personal capacities; R. VAN PELT, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal 
capacities; CALABRESE, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; J. 
MCBRIDE, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; T. MITCHELL, 
Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; R. CANETE, Treatment 
Team Member sued in their personal capacities; A. PAYNE, Treatment Team Member 
sued in their personal capacities; H. BURNETT, Treatment Team Member sued in their 
personal capacities; T. ROTH, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal 
capacities; J. BURNS, Treament Team Member sued in their personal capacities; R. 
FELDMANN, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; E. QUALIS; 
M. TARULLI, Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; S. SMITH, 
Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; E. BROWN, Treatment Team 
Member/Former Facilitator sued in their personal capacities; L. CHIAPPETTA, B.A., 
Asst. Social Worker/Treatment Team Member sued in their personal capacities; K. 
STOKES, Social Worker/Former Facilitator sued in their personal capacities; V. 
BRICKHOUSE, Rec. Department Supervisor sued in their personal capacities; MS. 
MCALLISTER, DHS Rec. Staff sued in their personal capacities; MS.  SIDDIGO, 
D.H.S. Rec Staff sued in their personal capacities; M. CAHILL, Treatment Team 
Member; BRIAN P. HUGHES, Assistant Deputy Public Defender sued in their personal 
capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-04240) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
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____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 15, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 John Banda appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Banda is currently civilly committed as a sexually violent predator at the Special 
Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey.  He filed this action against various STU 
staff members, alleging that they retaliated against him for filing grievances by placing 
him in a Modified Activities Program (MAP),1 which resulted in the loss of numerous 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 As we have explained, “MAP is a component of the clinical treatment program at the 
STU that focuses on stabilizing the disruptive behavior of uncooperative residents.  
Residents who are placed in MAP have fewer privileges than their fellow committees at 
STU—visiting hours are restricted, random cell searches are conducted more often, 
contact with other residents is greatly diminished, and their unescorted movement is 
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privileges, including his job.  This controversy started when Banda submitted an “Inmate 
Remedy System Form” in late March 2012, stating that he had been asked—presumably 
by a staff member—about his release plan.  Banda wrote in the remedy form, “[n]o 
disrespect, But after I Win My Civil Commitment Writ of Habeas Corpus, that would be 
none of your business.”  D.C. dkt. #1 at 40.  A staff member responded a few days later, 
stating that “this is neither [a] request or complaint.  It’s an angry statement and a waste 
of a form like this.  No doubt, you expressed exactly this to the [staff member] who asked 
the question.  Please exercise judgment.”  Id.  Banda replied soon after: “So what if you 
feel that this is a waste of a form, you folks waste paper each time you write your 
fraudulent reports on us residents.  So what if you may take it as an angry statement, I am 
just being informative and factual . . . so display your ignorance somewhere else.  It’s not 
needed here.”  Id. 
 About a month later, the Vocational Department sent Banda an unsigned memo 
stating that he had been denied overtime and access to an unspecified “sensitive area”— 
privileges that are “awarded in conjunction with [] cooperation in treatment,” according 
to the memo.  Id. at 41.  Banda immediately submitted another remedy form, complaining 
that the memo was a waste of paper because he had not been permitted overtime or 
access to sensitive areas for the past eight years.  A staff member responded and advised 
Banda that his “request [was] unintelligible.”  Banda submitted a reply, characterizing the 
response as “dumb and stupid,” stating that “you folks waste paper as well in sending 
                                                                                                                                                  
limited.”  Marcum v. Harris, 328 F. App'x 792, 794 (3d Cir. 2009) (non-precedential). 
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these asinine memos about overtime and sensitive area.”  Id. at 42.  About a week later, 
on May 21, 2012, Defendant Program Coordinator Corniel issued a memorandum to the 
Assistant Superintendent, stating that “the Treatment Team is placing resident Banda [] 
on Program MAP status effective immediately.  Despite counseling on the matter . . . . 
Banda utilizes abusive language towards staff members when expressing his views on the 
grievance forms.  Moreover, resident Banda does not utilize the grievance/request system 
to note a grievance or make a request.”  Id. at 38. 
 Banda submitted at least two more grievance forms containing similar language, 
one in July and the other in September.  In August, Defendant Program Coordinator 
Cahill extended Banda’s MAP status, observing that “he has not adequately addressed his 
behavioral issues that resulted in his [] placement.”  Id. at 47.  Cahill extended his status 
again in September, observing that “Banda removed a[n] activity sign-up sheet . . . 
result[ing] in the activity being cancelled.  Mr. Banda then proceeded to write a 
Remedy/Grievance form regarding the lack of the activity.”  Id. at 48.  The last available 
grievance is from October 2012, when Banda advised staff to “have a thicker skin.”  Id. 
at 50.  An April 4 memo from Corniel to the Assistant Superintendent advised that the 
treatment team had removed Banda from MAP as he had “addressed the behaviors that 
led to his [] placement as exhibited by a decrease in grievance submissions.”  Id. at 56.  
Banda filed this action a few months later, claiming that he was entitled to use the  
language that he did, and that Defendants improperly retaliated against him (by placing 
him in MAP) for doing so.  He cited a provision of the STU’s “Resident’s Guide” that 
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stated “[n]o one filing a grievance shall incur any form of restraint, interference, 
coercion, discrimination, or reprisals as a result of that action,” and also suggested that 
because he was in a treatment facility—and not a correctional facility—he enjoyed a right 
to utter “crude, coarse, vulgar, and offensive statement[s] made in the context of 
psychotherapy that was not threatening [and] not exhortative of disobedience or 
violence.”  D.C. dkt. #1 at 28.  He also alleged two additional instances of retaliation 
arising from his grievances—that Defendants removed a law-library clerk from his wing 
and refused him entry to a “special banquet”—and asserted an unrelated claim against his 
public defender. 
 The District Court initially screened Banda’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed his claims related to the law-library clerk, special 
banquet, and public defender.  It permitted him to proceed on the other retaliation claims, 
however, observing that “[t]he language used by Corniel [in the April 4 memo] could 
indicate that [Banda’s] placement on MAP status was related to the actual filing of the 
grievances and not the content.”  About a year later, the District Court granted 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
concluding that 19 Defendants lacked sufficient personal involvement, and that Banda 
failed to state a claim against the remaining five Defendants—Chiapetta, Stokes, 
Brickhouse, Main, and Corniel—because his “own allegations show that he was not 
deterred [from filing grievances] by his MAP placement, and, therefore, this placement 
cannot be an adverse action for the purpose of a § 1983 retaliation claim.”  The Court 
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dismissed Banda’s complaint without prejudice, but instead of amending his complaint, 
he filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his allegations were sufficient to state a 
claim.  The District Court denied reconsideration, and Banda timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. 
v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), and ask whether the complaint contains 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
A First Amendment retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to plead (1) a 
constitutionally protected activity; (2) an “adverse action . . . . sufficient to deter a person 
of ordinary firmness” from engaging in the activity; and (3) a casual connection.  Rauser 
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
The District Court concluded that Banda’s MAP placement was not an adverse action 
because it did not actually deter him from continuing to file grievances.  But whether 
Banda was actually deterred is immaterial; the question is whether “a person of ordinary 
firmness” would have been deterred.  Id.; see also Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 384 
(2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he fact that a particular plaintiff . . . responded to retaliation with 
                                              
2 We conclude that the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice is a final order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Banda has elected to stand on his complaint.  See Frederico v. 
Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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greater than ‘ordinary firmness’ does not deprive him of a cause of action.”).  Banda 
sufficiently pleaded an adverse action because his MAP placement—in addition to other 
significant restrictions—cost him his job.  See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 
286, 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (loss of prison job is sufficiently adverse to state a retaliation 
claim). 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Banda’s retaliation 
claims related to his MAP placement against Defendants Chiapetta, Stokes, Brickhouse, 
Main, and Corniel, and remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  We will affirm the District Court’s decision in all other respects.3  We 
express no view as to whether Banda sufficiently pleaded the other elements of a 
retaliation claim—whether his filing of grievances in this manner and under these 
circumstances constituted a protected activity or whether he has sufficiently alleged the 
requisite causal link—or whether Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.  
                                              
3 Banda waived any challenge to the District Court’s dismissal of the other Defendants or 
claims by failing to address their dismissal in his opening brief.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant's failure to 
identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 
appeal.”). 
